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The current crisis stems from a long period of macroeconomic imbalances, characterised by excess liquidity 
and major current account imbalances in certain areas of the world. This environment encouraged the 
issuance of low-yielding debt instruments, but also spurred investors to seek higher yields through more 
risky products. In this context, the transfer of credit risk by ﬁ  nancial institutions to protect their balance 
sheets resulted, due to the fragmentation and opacity of the markets, in a situation where the location of 
risks and the size of exposures were unclear.
This crisis calls for a thorough review of ﬁ  nancial regulation and in particular of the relations between 
markets, players and products. In the light of this situation, the primary objective of all regulators is to 
restore conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial system. The ﬁ  rst step in achieving this is to re-establish the soundness 
of its players. The second step then consists in addressing the disruptions in ﬁ  nancial markets: enhancing 
the transparency of the credit market, improving the security of settlement systems and, lastly, extending 
the scope of regulation to cover other market players such as hedge funds and credit rating agencies.
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A 
combination of four factors led to the 
deep-seated ﬁ  nancial and ensuing economic 
crisis of 2008:
￿ cheap excess liquidity;
￿ current account imbalances, i.e. a particularly 
marked deﬁ  cit in the United States and excess savings 
in Asia; 
￿ the search for ever-higher yields associated with 
the increasing segmentation of increasingly complex 
products;
￿ and lastly, and most importantly, the externalisation 
of risks taken by major ﬁ  nancial institutions in order 
to protect their balance sheets.
This externalisation or spreading of risk in the context 
of greater market opaqueness and fragmentation 
resulted in a situation in which the location of risks 
and the size of exposures were unclear.
This crisis, whose epicentre is in the United States, 
brought to light the fact that there is a general lack of 
information about the amount of risk transferred, the 
prices at which credit risk transfers were carried out, 
the net exposure of each player in this market 
as well as the ultimate risk holders.
Transactions involving credit risk transfer instruments 
are usually conducted outside the regulated markets. 
Transactions on over-the-counter (OTC) markets are, 
however, not  traditionally reported; price and volume 
data are therefore not necessarily disclosed to the all 
market players, with the exception of certain market 
segments or indices. Furthermore, investors are often 
lightly regulated or unregulated entities. As a result, 
it is difﬁ  cult to assess the real breadth, depth and 
liquidity of this market and consequently the true 
level of liabilities and exposure of its players. 
This crisis calls for a thorough review of ﬁ  nancial 
regulation and in particular of the relations between 
markets, players and products. In light of this 
situation, the primary objective of all regulators is to 
restore conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial system. However, 
in such an environment, regulators have to deal with 
the difﬁ  culties arising from the current fragmentation 
of responsibilities at the institutional, operational, 
geographical and legal levels.
￿ At the institutional level, the powers of regulators 
remain limited with regard to many aspects of the chain 
that are currently managed by the players themselves 
through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. 
For instance, all the legal aspects of international 
derivatives transactions are established by a professional 
association, ISDA – International Swap and Derivatives 
Association, and certain key market benchmarks such 
as the LIBOR rate or credit spread indices such as ABX 
or iTRAXX, which have been strongly contested, are 
set respectively by the British Bankers’ Association 
and a private financial information provider, 
Markit, which is owned by a number of large banks.
￿ At the operational level, as regards regulated 
sectors, the players in the chain are regulated or 
supervised by a wide range of bodies: ranging from 
the large US banks that are regulated by the Federal 
Reserve, local banks and insurers that have no 
federal supervision but are subject to regulation by 
their State of incorporation, to European ﬁ  nancial 
institutions that are subject to sectoral directives and 
each supervised by specialised supervisors from their 
home Member State.
￿ At the geographical level, the credit market has 
become difﬁ  cult to deﬁ  ne in terms of territoriality: 
where does the regulatory competence lie for a 
credit swap contract on US underlying assets (partly 
guaranteed by a monoline insurer regulated in 
Bermuda), traded OTC by brokers in London but 
recorded, on  the one hand, on the books of a hedge 
fund domiciled in Jersey or Grand Cayman and, on 
the other hand, on those of a French bank in Paris?
￿ At the legal level, credit markets now intermingle 
transactions based on securities, contracts and 
guarantees: for instance, banks can issue loan 
contracts (e.g. mortgage loans or consumer credit 
card loans), reﬁ  nanced by the issuance of secutities 
(e.g. asset-backed securities/mortgage-backed 
securities – ABSs/MBSs), which are enhanced by 
guarantees (e.g. monoline insurers), but whose 
risks are then transferred by derivatives contracts 
(e.g. credit default swaps – CDSs), which are 
themselves repackaged as securities (e.g. collateralised 
debt obligations/collateralised loan obligations –
CDOs/CLOs), but in their turn resecuritised 
through asset-backed commercial paper conduits 
(e.g. asset-backed commercial paper – ABCPs) or 
covered again by contracts (e.g. CDSs), and so on.
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1| EXTEND THE SCOPE 
OF REGULATION 
In this context, market regulators are reﬂ  ecting 
on ways to strengthen the traditional tools for 
prudential and macroﬁ  nancial regulation through 
another approach that takes speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancial market 
developments into account. 
This principle was clearly set out by the G20 in its 
summits of November 2008 and April 2009 where it 
committed to ensuring appropriate regulation and 
oversight of all systemically important ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, markets and instruments.
 
A review of the scope of regulation is  therefore 
necessary in order to supervise more closely certain 
areas in which market players have been left to 
regulate themselves. This review will require an 
adaptation of regulation in particular concerning the 
way in which it is applied to non-regulated markets 
or entities. However, this task will be complicated 
by the major discrepancies that exist between the 
latter. In this context, a review of the tools available 
to regulators is essential in order to enhance their 
effectiveness.
The crisis has shown the need for closer coordination 
between ﬁ  nancial market regulators and prudential 
regulators in particular in terms of risk assessment. 
Indeed, prudential regulation chieﬂ  y focuses on the 
solvency of the intermediaries, without intervening 
in the functioning of unregulated market segments in 
which entities other than intermediaries participate. 
Financial market regulation, for its part, has focused 
on the functioning of regulated markets, codes of 
conduct for players on these markets and ﬁ  nancial 
disclosure requirements for issuers on these markets. 
Analyses of the crisis have evidenced the impact of 
the activity of non-regulated entities and the trading 
of unregulated products on the world ﬁ  nancial 
system and thus call for a review of the scope of 
supervisors’ remits.
2| FOUNDATION OF A NEW 
  ARCHITECTURE
The need to enhance the international regulatory 
framework was a key objective of the G20, which 
transformed the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) into 
the Financial Stability Council (FSC), broadening its 
mandate, strengthening, alongside the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), its authority in the global 
governance of regulation and setting out its powers 
and objectives with regard to ﬁ  nancial stability. At 
the end of the 1990s, during the Asian and Russian 
ﬁ  nancial crises (1997 and 1998 respectively), it 
became clear that increased coordination between 
prudential and market regulation was necessary. 
This new approach gave rise, at the institutional 
level, to the creation of the FSF. In order to improve 
the consistency of regulatory standards at the global 
level, the FSF, together with the main standard-setting 
bodies like the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions and the Basel Committee, 
was charged with promoting the convergence of 
international ﬁ  nancial regulations in accordance 
with high-level principles. The members of the FSC 
will set out to foster ﬁ  nancial stability, increase the 
openness and transparency of the ﬁ  nancial sector, 
and implement international ﬁ  nancial standards. 
They undertake to carry out periodic peer reviews 
based in particular on the reports of the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), established by 
the IMF and the World Bank. The FSC will have to 
regularly report to the IMF’s International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC) on the progress 
made in regulatory reform aimed at implementing 
solutions to the crisis. The IMFC is expected to 
be transformed into a Council authorised to take 
decisions in accordance with the IMF Articles of 
Agreement.
At the European level, the Larosière Report makes 
recommendations on how to strengthen supervision 
and crisis management in Europe. It proposes 
that the system should continue to be based on 
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national supervisory authorities and recommends 
consolidation of European regulation through 
“enhanced” Level 3 Committees (L3L). The report 
advocates the setting up of a European System 
of Financial Supervisors, (ESFS), consisting of a 
decentralised network formed by these “enhanced” 
Level 3 Committees that will be termed “Authorities”. 
The role of these Authorities would be to coordinate 
the application of supervisory standards and guarantee 
strong cooperation between the national supervisors. 
3| PRIORITIES FOR RESTORING 
  CONFIDENCE IN THE 
  FINANCIAL MARKETS
The ﬁ  rst prerequisite for restoring conﬁ  dence is for 
players to be sound. It is therefore important for the 
balance sheets of large institutions to be purged of 
their toxic assets. Second, the major disruptions in 
ﬁ  nancial markets, in particular the credit market, 
need to be addressed. Four issues appear to be 
particularly important:
￿ the transparency of the credit market;
￿ the organisation of the post-trade infrastructure; 
￿ hedge funds; 
￿ the role of credit rating agencies.
3|1 The  transparency 
of the credit market
Although often criticised for its role in the initial 
phases of the crisis, thanks to its unquestionable 
merits securitisation has been widely used for over 
25 years. This technique has made it possible to 
optimise corporate ﬁ  nancing conditions by legally 
isolating speciﬁ  c assets of better intrinsic quality than 
that of their balance sheet as a whole. Moreover, by 
structuring products it is possible to tailor the risk/
return characteristics of each credit tranche to ﬁ  t 
the demand of different investor types. Even CDOs, 
at which much criticism is being levelled, originally 
merely replicated corporate loan portfolios that were 
relatively homogeneous and fairly transparent in 
terms of their overall risk proﬁ  le. 
Nevertheless, the securitisation model itself led 
market players to be less stringent in their monitoring 
of the quality of investments. Reports on the crisis 
published by the FSF and International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), among others, 
already invited the originators of securitised products 
to step up their due diligence and risk management 
for underlying assets in order to ensure that the 
quality of the assets securitised and sold was 
equivalent to that of the assets they keep on their 
balance sheets. 
This objective was echoed by the European 
Commission in the framework of amendments to the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), requiring the 
originators or distributors of the credit risk products 
themselves to retain at least 5% of the exposure. 
This text is expected to be adopted in the second 
quarter of 2009.
In the securitisation process, it is important for 
investors to have sufficient information on the 
initial nature of and changes over time in the assets 
underlying securitisation transactions. This crisis 
showed that there is a lack of transparency in this area. 
In the primary market, the documentation on the 
investment vehicles most open to money market fund 
managers, involving short-term instruments such as 
ABCPs, did not have sufﬁ  cient details or explanations 
for investors to be able to analyse the quality of the 
underlying assets or understand how they might 
behave in the event of a turnaround in the market.
Furthermore, secondary transactions in credit risk 
transfer instruments are largely carried out OTC, 
making it difﬁ  cult to assess the real depth and liquidity 
of the market. Prices and volumes of transactions are 
only disclosed to the market on certain very limited 
segments or via indices. These trading systems also 
pose problems at the operational level owing to the 
lack of shared clearing and settlement infrastructures 
for these instruments. Moreover, the crisis has brought 
to light the general lack of information on actual risk 
transfers, the identity of the ultimate holders of risk 
and the net exposure of the different players. 
Therefore, in order to enable investors to take better 
investment and risk management decisions in the 
future, it is necessary to increase transparency on 
primary and secondary credit markets, improve 
the quality of information provided to investors on 
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complex ﬁ  nancial products, and improve the security 
of securities settlement systems and contracts at the 
legal and technical level.
At the international level, IOSCO published in 
May 20091 a consultation paper in response to 
concerns expressed by the G20 in November 2008 
regarding the crisis and the pivotal role that certain 
unregulated market segments and products had 
played in the evolution of capital markets. Taking 
securitisation and CDSs as examples, IOSCO 
identiﬁ  ed the areas in which regulation could be 
a major factor in restoring conﬁ  dence in ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The proposed recommendations aim in 
particular to bolster investor conﬁ  dence in these 
markets and improve the functioning and supervision 
of non-regulated products and markets. These 
recommendations focus, inter alia, on transparency, 
disclosure of information and the due diligence of 
the players in the securitisation chain.
At the European level, in December  2008 the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
published a consultation paper entitled Non-Equity 
Market Transparency, focusing largely on the corporate 
debt market, structured ﬁ  nancial products and credit 
derivatives. In the latter two areas, the CESR set out 
to examine the role of post-trading transparency in 
price formation as well as in information about the 
scale of credit risk transfers. Its ﬁ  nal report is set to 
be published in the second quarter of 2009.
For a long time the Autorité des marchés ﬁ  nanciers 
(AMF – Financial Markets Authority) has been calling 
for greater post-trading transparency in order to 
improve the efﬁ  ciency of the market. It supports the 
measures advocated by the European Commission 
and the European Parliament to minimise potential 
conﬂ  icts of interest between the holders of the 
different tranches of securitised products and thus 
contribute to restoring conﬁ  dence in this market. The 
importance of this issue is undeniable and is at the core 
of the tasks of regulators, which consist in ensuring 
the quality of investor information and protecting 
savings invested in ﬁ  nancial products. Nevertheless, 
it is evident that progress in this domain is difﬁ  cult 
due to the fact that there is no real consensus among 
regulators about the effectiveness of exploring an 
area that has to date escaped market regulation. 
3|2 The  organisation 
of the post-trade infrastructure
The July 2005 report of the Counterparty Risk 
Management Policy Group II stressed the signiﬁ  cant 
increase in the use of credit derivatives and insisted 
on the potential risks associated with the post-trading 
infrastructure of these instruments. It set out 
proposals for minimising these risks such as the 
automation of trading ﬂ  ows. The ﬁ  nancial crisis 
has underscored the importance of implementing 
solutions to manage these risks. The FSF report of 
April 2008 was among the ﬁ  rst to call for clearing 
services for OTC derivatives transactions, in order 
to ensure a better control of counterparty risk and 
the conditions in which cash and securities transfers 
are carried out between the players concerned. A 
number of initiatives in this area have already been 
announced in the United States and Europe. 
At the European level, following the publication of the 
press release on 17 October 2008 by Charlie McCreevy, 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services, the Commission set up a working group of 
market participants and supervisors that resulted, 
in February 2009, in a roadmap to ensure that 
credit default swaps (CDS) are cleared via at least 
one European central clearing counterparty before 
31 July 2009. 
On 18 December 2008, the Eurosystem announced its 
wish that such central counterparty clearing facilities 
for OTC credit derivatives derivatives be established 
in the euro area, constituting the other key element 
for operational solutions in this area. 
The  Haut Comité de Place (High-Level Market 
Committee), chaired by the Minister of the Economy, 
Industry and Employment, decided to set up a task 
force to make proposals on clearing activities in 
France and European clearing initiatives regarding 
derivatives currently traded on OTC markets. The 
AMF supports this important decision.
It now appears essential to make rapid progress on a 
euro area infrastructure that provides the necessary 
guarantees in terms of both the quality of members 
of clearing systems and efﬁ  ciency in the treatment 
1 http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS143.pdf
FSR13_JOUYET.indd   93 FSR13_JOUYET.indd   93 01/07/2009   16:06:52 01/07/2009   16:06:52ARTICLES
Jean-Pierre Jouyet: “The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation”
94  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 13 – The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation ￿ September 2009
of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. The AMF has already stressed the 
need to ensure healthy competition between the 
different players in order that this process results 
in greater economic efﬁ  ciency. 
3|3 Hedge  funds 
Hedge fund activity has grown to such an extent that 
its consequences for ﬁ  nancial stability and market 
efﬁ  ciency cannot be ignored. While hedge funds are 
not responsible for the current ﬁ  nancial crisis, some 
of them, in the same way as other major investors, 
may have contributed to fuelling the speculative 
bubble and the sharp decline in asset prices that 
started in summer 2007. Moreover, hedge funds are 
traditionally opaque in order to protect their “trade 
secret”, i.e. the strategies they use. Yet, this opacity 
makes it more difﬁ  cult for prudential regulators to 
assess where systemic risks lie and their magnitude, 
both for the banking system (counterparty risk) and 
ﬁ  nancial markets (risk of inefﬁ  ciency). On a number 
of occasions the AMF has stressed the need to put an 
end to the opacity of offshore hedge funds that still 
prevails. Hedge funds should therefore be subject 
to reporting requirements vis-à-vis the prudential 
supervisors as well as «indirect» regulations imposing 
transparency obligations on their counterparties, in 
particular their prime brokers. 
Given the organisation of hedge funds, only through 
international coordination can appropriate rules be 
deﬁ  ned that guarantee risk control, in particular 
systemic risk, at the global level. IOSCO and the FSC are 
apposite bodies for developing such an approach. 
At the European level, the European Commission’s 
Draft Directive on Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers (AIFMs) published on 29 April  2009 
underscores the stakes attached to hedge funds. The 
terms of this Draft Directive are in line with the G20 
guidelines set out in London on 2 April, in particular 
with respect to the reduction of systemic risk. That 
said, on closer analysis, a number of points deserve 
particular attention. 
Indeed, the draft directive requires investment 
managers of funds marketed to investors in the 
European Union and not currently subject to 
European level regulation (including, among other, 
hedge funds) to be authorised and regulated in a 
Member State and to be subject to organisational 
requirements (management of risk, liquidity, conﬂ  icts 
of interest, etc.) as well as to prudential requirements 
(minimum capital). These AIFMs will be required to 
report to European prudential regulators on all the 
funds they manage, assets and markets in which 
they invest, their leverage and the risk management 
procedures they use. However, the requirements 
will only apply to AIFMs managing portfolios with 
total assets exceeding EUR 100 million (including 
any assets acquired through the use of leverage) or 
EUR 500 million when the portfolio consists of assets 
that are not leveraged and with no redemption rights 
exercisable during a period of 5 years following the 
date of constitution of each.
These provisions could mean that that hedge funds 
based in offshore centres or managed by AIFMs that 
are not subject to the directive because their assets 
under management are below the above-mentioned 
threshold might escape all transparency obligations 
vis-à-vis the prudential regulators even though they 
may pose systemic risks. For example, an AIFM with 
less than EUR 100 million in assets under management 
could obtain substantial leverage, implying potential 
system consequences. 
Moreover, under the draft directive, AIFMs will be 
entitled to market alternative investment funds to 
professional investors in any Member State as soon 
as this text comes into force for hedge funds based in 
Europe and three years following this for hedge funds 
based in offshore centres. The AMF is in favour of a 
European «label» for hedge funds based in Europe in 
the case of those complying with strict governance 
and transparency rules. However, the AMF shares the 
views of the French authorities and is not in favour of 
the idea of a passport for offshore hedge funds. Such 
a mechanism could result in unfair competition from 
offshore hedge funds, thus penalising French AIFs 
that are subject to a regulatory framework governing 
both the funds and their managers. Indeed, the crisis 
has showed the importance of a secure framework. 
Furthermore, this passport would lead to massive 
regulatory arbitrage to the detriment of undertakings 
for collective investments in transferable securities 
(UCITS) and, consequently, a reduction in the level of 
protection of investors, including individual investors.
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3|4  The role of credit rating agencies
Given their central role in the structured ﬁ  nance 
market, credit rating agencies are considered to be 
partly responsible for the excesses and disruptions 
leading to the subprime crisis. With ratings covering 
debt to the tune of USD around 45 trillion, the 
amount of assets analysed by credit rating agencies 
is equivalent to the total of bank balance sheets. 
They have acquired this position through both 
economies of scale that enable them to perform 
their core function of data collection, modelling 
and analysis covering all issuers, and through the 
ofﬁ  cial recognition afforded by over three decades 
of US regulation. Credit rating agencies have thus 
largely fuelled the debates thrown up by the crisis. 
Their role in assessing the credit risk of securitisation 
vehicles has been called into question, and doubts 
have been raised as to the reliability of the rating 
of structured ﬁ  nance products (problems in the 
management of conflicts of interest, excessive 
volatility due to the poor quality of the models used 
or the lack of hindsight, etc.). 
At the international level, market regulators have 
rapidly addressed these issues. In particular, after 
an in-depth examination of the role of credit rating 
agencies on the structured product market, IOSCO 
amended certain aspects of its code of conduct so 
that it takes into account speciﬁ  c features related to 
the rating of structured ﬁ  nancial products. It then 
analysed the implementation of this new code by 
credit rating agencies. It is now considering stepping 
up coordination at the international level of the 
regulation and oversight of credit rating agencies. 
This initiative is backed by the G20. 
At the regional level, wide-reaching changes in the 
way credit rating agencies are regulated have been 
set into motion, in particular in Europe; a draft 
regulation on credit rating agencies was published 
by the Commission in November 2008 and adopted in 
late April 2009. This regulation calls for a shift from 
a system of self-regulation of credit rating agencies 
to their effective and coordinated supervision at the 
Community level.
At the national level, the AMF has been contributing to 
debates over the past ﬁ  ve years through the publication 
of its annual report on credit rating agencies. Before 
the start of the crisis, the AMF had requested that 
the supervision model for credit rating agencies be 
adapted and made a number of proposals accordingly. 
It is crucial to ensure that the implementation of 
the new European regulation guarantees the quality, 
transparency and integrity of the ratings process. 
Some key elements of this regulation will be set out in 
the next few months in the framework of the CESR’s 
forthcoming guidelines. One of the main aspects is 
the organisation of the supervision of credit rating 
agencies by the competent authorities. The college 
of supervisors set up for each credit rating agency 
will play a key role in this framework as will the 
supervision resources and tools to be put in place. 
The AMF wishes to stress that using the services of a 
credit rating agency should not prevent fund managers 
investing in structured products on behalf of UCITS, 
especially those marketed to individual investors, from 
carrying out their own due diligence and checks. 
The current ﬁ  nancial crisis has brought to the fore some of the fundamental issues of regulation. 
The securitisation and subprime crisis has shed considerable doubt on the originate-to-distribute model, 
which had largely contributed to the ﬁ  nancing of the economy. The crisis has revealed weaknesses with 
regard to the transparency of the structured product market, the management of conﬂ  icts of interest 
and the assessment of credit risk by the various players and, in particular, the credit rating agencies. 
Financial regulators, within the FSF, have contributed to the work of the G20 by publishing a series of 
recommendations aiming to restore conﬁ  dence in this market. 
.../...
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However, it is important to avoid focusing in the short-term only on the resolution of the current crisis 
or overreacting by implementing a new wave of regulations that may not prove useful. In order to ﬁ  nd a 
solution to these market dysfunctions both a close cooperation at the global level and a greater integration 
of markets in Europe are required; this would be beneﬁ  cial to investors and industry. Both the pursuit 
of such a solution and the prospects of that which still remains to be done in Europe should encourage 
Member States to think about and more generally, to commit to developing a more effective ﬁ  nancial 
regulation in order to foster competitiveness and protect savings.
The major economic areas compete internationally to attract capital. Regulation is an important factor in 
this competition, even though it is naturally not the only one. Jurisdictions with lax regulation may attract 
activity in the short-term, but run the risk of losing it forever if a crisis of conﬁ  dence occurs.
For Europe, where, on the one hand, the savings pool, which is already one of the largest in the world, 
is likely to expand further as populations realise how difﬁ  cult it will be to maintain their standard of living 
during retirement, and where, on the other hand, the ﬁ  nancial industry is one of the major sectors of the 
economy, what is important is not the absolute level of regulation but its effectiveness. Effective regulation 
does not bring into conﬂ  ict the interests of savers and professionals. Rather, it creates and maintains a 
level of conﬁ  dence in the market that lets savers entrust their assets to professionals, with the assurance 
that their investment will be managed in their interest, in accordance with rules of the game. Effective 
regulation should not give rise to costs generated by the uniform application of bureaucratic procedures 
but should be a source of value added: the gains that it procures from guaranteeing conﬁ  dence should 
outweigh the costs of complying with it. 
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The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation:
an exchange of views 1
A conference took place on 3 March 2009, on the issue of the future of ﬁ  nancial regulation, between 
Anil Kashyap and several Banque de France staff members.
Six issues were discussed: 
• the future of capital regulation; 
• liquidity regulation; 
• macroprudential regulation; 
• moral hazard; 
• the relationship between monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial stability; and 
• bank restructuring. 
Here is the transcript of their discussion. Three main conclusions emerged from the discussion: 
• regulators should design mechanisms aimed at avoiding asset ﬁ  re sales in stress times, possibly through 
a mandatory mechanism for recapitalisation; 
• strengthening central banks’ responsibilities for ﬁ  nancial stability should not blur their main task of 
maintaining price stability;
• the current situation is fundamentally different from the Japanese experience during the “lost decade” 
insofar as in Japan, banking losses came from lending to bad ﬁ  rms whereas today, problems come from 
bad collateral.
1  Transcript of a discussion between Anil Kashyap, Professor of Economics and Finance at Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Jean-Pierre Landau, 
Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, Sylvie Matherat, Financial Stability Director, Pierre-Francois Weber, Financial Stability Directorate, and Benoît Mojon, 
Monetary and Financial Analysis Directorate.
 ANIL KASHYAP
Professor of Economics and Finance, 
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago
BANQUE DE FRANCE
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1| THE FUTURE 
  OF BANKING CAPITAL REGULATION
Jean-Pierre Landau: Has the crisis revealed a 
regulatory failure? Does Basel II need to be amended?
Anil Kashyap: The current capital regime is 
characterised by its strong asymmetry over the 
credit cycle: in good times, the market does not 
require banks to hold much capital and exerts little 
monitoring.  Banks using their own internal models 
of risk that mimic the market’s assessment can 
easily expand credit and at best the regulatory rules 
slow this down a bit.  When the slowdown comes, 
the market (and the banks’ models) suggest the 
required capital buffer is far above the regulatory 
requirement. Put differently, everyone understands 
that if we cut regulatory capital requirements right 
now it would have no effect on bank behaviour 
because banks need very high levels of capital just 
to attract funding. This asymmetry means that 
ﬁ  nancial system ampliﬁ  es cycles, something that 
has also been evident since the middle of 2007.
Therefore, capital regulation needs to be amended to 
avoid excessive deleveraging during the slowdown. 
This requires constraining banks’ ability to expand 
their balance sheets and leverage during good times.   
If this can be done then the banks might enter the 
slowdown with enough capital to not have to cut 
back their lending. This would reduce the extent 
of asset ﬁ  re sales in times of stress that result from 
the bank system collectively selling assets to comply 
with capital ratios.
But achieving this will not be that easy. The pitfall 
in this solution lies in the need to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage. Constraining banks’ leverage in good times 
will incite them to transfer their assets to a shadow 
banking system in order to escape regulation. 
Jean-Pierre Landau: In good times, no capital 
regulation is likely to bite. Hence there is a need to 
prevent risk taking per se. Do you think that requiring 
more capital is enough to achieve this? Would it be 
sufﬁ  cient in order to avoid deleveraging in bad times?
Anil Kashyap: An analogy can be made with 
monetary policy. In conducting monetary policy, 
central banks can ﬁ  x quantities (through the level 
of reserve requirements) or prices (through the 
level of the interest rate). Along the same lines, 
in my 2004 paper with Jeremy Stein, we put 
forward the idea of creating a market for regulatory 
capital relief. This market would be supplied by 
the regulator (central banks or supervisor) with 
a small amount of tradable capital certiﬁ  cates 
provided through periodical auctions. The market 
price of these certiﬁ  cates would be a direct and 
transparent measure of the shadow value of bank 
capital. In this way, a high price would indicate 
a relative shortage of bank capital to regulators. 
The regulator may then be allowed to increase the 
supply of certiﬁ  cates in response to rising prices, 
so as to tie the effective capital requirement to 
the shadow value.
Jean-Pierre Landau: I interpret your proposal as 
a way to create an artiﬁ  cial scarcity of capital, as 
monetary authorities do with central bank liquidity 
through reserve requirements.
Anil Kashyap: Exactly. Your remark leads me to 
ask you whether Banque de France has considered 
implementing such a mechanism of pricing capital.
Jean-Pierre Landau: We are carrying out reﬂ  ections 
at the Banque de France on the way of ensuring an 
appropriate pricing of risks in good times aimed at 
changing incentives and reducing the procyclicality of 
ﬁ  nancial systems. To that end, ﬁ  nancial reporting and 
accounting systems should force banks to retain and put 
aside proﬁ  ts in good times and allow them to use these 
buffers in bad times.
Anil Kashyap: Changing the accounting framework 
to recognise that ﬁ  nancial stability is something 
that merits consideration.  The accountants tend to 
focus only on realised losses and worry that allowing 
provisioning against potential losses is a license to 
manipulate earnings. This may be true, but there 
are beneﬁ  ts to having banks build up a buffer when 
times are good.  
In addition, banks should have to draw up business 
continuity plans for crisis management. Large 
banks and other systemically relevant institutions 
should have to tell their supervisors how they could 
be quickly wound down.  These plans would force 
ﬁ  nancial institutions to internalise extreme risks in 
their risk management system.  Figuring out where 
to draw the line on which organisations are subject 
to this rule is going to be a challenge. 
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Sylvie Matherat: Your proposal is converging with 
the works in progress within the Financial Stability 
Forum: a working group chaired by John Gieve, 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, recently 
issued a report on cross-border crisis management. 
This report advocates the elaboration by groups of 
authorities of ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ   c contingency planning 
exercises covering practicalities and strategic policy 
considerations.
Jean-Pierre Landau: Your point on tail risks is 
essential. It seems obvious that this kind of risks has not 
been internalised by the ﬁ  nancial systems. It is likely 
that ﬁ  nancial innovation has reduced average risks, 
but magniﬁ  ed tail risks. A crucial question related to 
this is whether it would be economically and socially 
efﬁ  cient for ﬁ  nancial intermediaries to insure against 
tail risks. In other words, should insurance be private 
or socialised?
Anil Kashyap: The key point may not be whether 
insurance should be private or public, although if it 
is public we need to bear in mind that it may lead to 
some underpricing of risk. Rather, what we should 
keep in mind that the purpose of this to avoid rapid 
asset disposal and a credit crunch when tail risks 
materialise. Banks should continue to carry out their 
function of intermediation in any case. At the same 
time, the private sector should be forced to do the 
pricing of tail risks and to bear the costs. This might 
turn out to come at a very high price for banks but 
would allow avoiding the recurrence of situations 
such as the rescue of AIG in which taxpayers bear 
the costs in an unfair way.
Pierre-François Weber: The question of the 
overcomplexity of capital regulation within the 
framework of Basel II is often raised. In your opinion, 
what kind of incentives does this alleged overcomplexity 
create? 
Anil Kashyap: Understanding the models that the 
banks have created under Basel II is a challenge. 
But the more important point is to amend Basel II 
to make sure that there is a mandatory mechanism 
for recapitalisation.
Pierre-François Weber: As you know there is a 
debate about the scope of regulation. Do you think 
that the regulatory framework should be expanded 
beyond banks, notably to hedge funds and the shadow 
banking system?
Anil Kashyap: From a general point of view, public 
authorities should refrain from expanding regulation 
excessively. Hedge funds are not a root cause of 
the crisis. That being said, hedge funds may have 
contributed to ﬁ  re sales and created externalities in 
the markets. Their role as stress ampliﬁ  ers might 
justify an expansion of regulation to cover these 
actors. Perhaps this can be accomplished simply by 
having them disclose more to supervisors.  
2| LIQUIDITY REGULATION
Jean-Pierre Landau: A major dimension of tail risk 
has to do with liquidity risk. Could you think of a device 
which could induce ﬁ  nancial institutions to internalise 
systemic risk of liquidity and of their transformation 
activities?
Anil Kashyap: This can be tied back to capital 
requirements. Clearly, larger institutions can cause 
more problems on that liquidity front and should be 
held to a higher standard, since they impose a bigger 
externality. They pose a bigger risk as a result of 
short-term debt reﬁ  nancing. Hence, they should be 
charged differently.
The problem is that higher “tax” may lead big ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to search for ways to overcome the 
regulation. Therefore, this should be accompanied 
by a new reporting regime, to follow more closely 
what large banks are doing.
Sylvie Matherat: Do you have a tax in mind?
Anil Kashyap: Any type of such measure is, 
effectively a “tax”; we should refer to it as such. 
We need to recognise that larger institutions create 
more risk. The capital ratio should depend both 
on the composition of assets, and the composition 
of liabilities.
Recall that we have an incentive problem: how to 
constrain large institutions in expansion times, 
without “strangling” them and driving them to try 
to shift their activities to avoid regulation.
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Jean-Pierre Landau: Are there any other regulations 
to be considered, such as looking at the compensation 
structure? 
Anil Kashyap: Surely, we could also look at the 
compensation structure. What we need to realise 
is that all of these proposals may reduce efﬁ  ciency 
and the mobility of resources. Hence, all of these 
measures should be considered as a form of “tax”.
3| THE MACROPRUDENTIAL
  APPROACH
Jean-Pierre Landau: The economic costs of ﬁ  nancial 
crises and the limited scope of microprudential 
supervision strengthen the case for implementing 
a macroprudential surveillance. How should 
macroprudential regulation and supervision proceed? 
Do you consider that it should be underpinned by 
automatic stabilisers into the capital regime or leave 
some room for discretion?
Anil Kashyap: These are critical questions that have 
received too little attention so far. Ultimately, central 
banks need to be involved in supervision for several 
reasons. First, they are the liquidity providers and 
need to have an informed judgement in order to 
take responsible decisions on whether to rescue or 
not banking institutions. Second, experience shows 
that supervisory agencies tend to be captured by the 
institutions they supervise. This risk questions the 
relevance of Basel II internal ratings-based approach.
As regards over-the-counter derivatives markets, 
central banks need to be involved in the process 
of creating central counterparties, with regard to 
the systemic risks embedded in such markets. The 
difﬁ  culty lies in the effective implementation and the 
need to ﬁ  nd a way of keeping central banks informed 
without overburdening them. Another pitfall results 
from the lack of data, which has meant much of the 
existing work has been purely theoretical.
4| MORAL HAZARD
Jean-Pierre Landau: Historically, we built our 
regulation system around the idea that moral hazard 
should be dealt with so as to ensure that market 
discipline functions. Would you agree on the ﬁ  nding that 
the way in which public authorities collectively managed 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis has undermined this framework? 
If so, what would you suggest for the design of future 
ﬁ  nancial regulation?
Anil Kashyap: To answer your question, we should 
look at history. During the Great Depression, the 
US Supreme Court modiﬁ  ed private debt contracts 
and public authorities decided to close markets 
temporarily, in a move which was described as 
outrageous and heralding the end of capitalism. 
I agree that the argument of moral hazard will be 
signiﬁ  cantly weakened for a while. It played a key role 
in Lehman Brothers’ failure but its implementation 
has proved to be very difﬁ  cult with the handling of 
Bear Stearns.
Jean-Pierre Landau: I agree with you on the lessons we 
can draw from these two examples. Market participants 
followed strategic behaviours on the occasions of these 
two institutions’ distress, some actors were searching 
for opportunities.
Anil Kashyap: These events point to the urgent 
need for an internally and time-consistent 
resolution regime that allows to let ﬁ  nancial 
institutions fail without crippling the entire 
ﬁ  nancial system. 
5| THE RELATIONSHIP
  BETWEEN FINANCIAL STABILITY
  AND MONETARY POLICY
Jean-Pierre Landau: Should Central Banks be given 
a mandate for ﬁ  nancial stability, which is at the same 
level as the objective of price stability?
Anil Kashyap: The conduct of monetary policy 
and the supervision of the ﬁ  nancial sector are not 
necessarily part of the same skill set. To give you 
an example, the US regulatory agency has been 
criticised by the Consumer protection agency as a 
result of the subprime mortgage lending situation. 
More generally the issues related to most elements 
of consumer protection have little to do with macro 
or monetary economics. 
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Even though ﬁ  nancial stability has macroeconomic 
implications, I am not sure Central Banks have 
those skills. If at all, there should be a section of 
the Central Bank exclusively dedicated to this 
function, to avoid any conﬂ   ict of interest. We 
also may run into the risk of making the Federal 
Reserve Bank Chairman the target of criticisms. It is 
always difﬁ  cult for the Central Bank to lean against 
the wind. 
That said, there should indeed be a separate voice 
that is tasked with monitoring changes in conditions 
of ﬁ  nancial markets.
6| BANK RESTRUCTURING 
Benoît Mojon: How do we avoid the problem of “zombie 
lending”? How can we organise a restructuring without 
deleveraging: Can we clean-up the balance sheets 
without causing a major recession?
Anil Kashyap: The situation in the United States is 
different from the problem in Japan. In Japan, lending 
was made to “bad ﬁ  rms”, while in the United States, 
lending was made to “bad collateral”. If Congress were 
to (say) force Citibank to lend to GM, that would be 
a disaster for both Citibank and for taxpayers, if as 
I expect the loans wind up not being repaid. 
If we can afford to move all the bad assets to a 
different part of the bank, the private sector would 
again recapitalise the “good” part of the bank. 
Running a stress test on the banks to ﬁ  gure out the 
size of the bad assets problem is the right ﬁ  rst step. 
Jean-Pierre Landau: Would you advocate punishing 
investors holding bonds of distressed banks?
Anil Kashyap: There has to be some imposition of 
losses to bond-holders. If this were not a ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ   rm, bankruptcy laws would make clear what 
bond-holders would share some of the losses as a 
result of the liquidation.
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